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BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff-Appellants, State of Utah and three named women, Joann 
L. Clark, Sharon 0. Bowen and Mary 0. Vigil, appeal from identical memo-
randum decisions rendered in the District Court of Weber County, State of 
Utah, granting summary judgment of dismissal of their complaints under 
the Uniform Civil Liability for Support Act, §§78-^5-1 et seq. U.C.A. 
1953, as amended (hereinafter UCLSA). 
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DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Appellants brought separate actions in the District Court of 
Weber County, the Honorable Calvin Gould, presiding, for reimbursement 
of funds expended for the support of the three named woman Appellants, 
suit having been brought under the UCLSA, §78-45-9 U.C.A. 1953 (pre-1975 
amendment version. All references to §78-45-9 herein are to the pre-
1975 amendment version of said section.) All three cases were heard 
together on defendants1 motions for summary judgment on the 30th day of 
April, 1975. 
After hearing arguments on said motions, the Court granted 
summary judgment of dismissal to each of the three defendants. Judge 
Gould issued identical memorandum decisions in each case, holding that 
plaintiffs could not recover under the UCLSA and would not be entitled 
to a judgment for a sum certain without first obtaining an order for 
monthly support against defendants. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondents seek affirmance of the memorandum decisions and 
petition the Supreme Court to declare that for an order of support to 
be obtained under the Uniform Civil Liability for Support Act, either 
for prospective support or reimbursement for support already provided, 
a hearing must first be conducted pursuant to the criteria of §78-45-7 
U.C.A.1953, as amended. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondents agree substantially with the STATEMENT OF FACTS 
in Appellants' Brief, except as hereinbelow indicated, and would make 
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1iabi1ity for support exists only after a court has determined that 
liability and, furthermore, that in proceedings under the UCLSA, the 
determination of both prospective and retrospective support liability 
must be made by the District Court pursuant to the criteria set out in 
§78-45-7 U.C.A. 
Liability for support, by which is meant judicial determi-
nation of the amount of support, should be based in part on the obligor's 
(usually the father's) actual current ability to provide it. Utah's 
case law is in agreement with this view. In Hulse v. Hulse, I I I Utah 193, 
176 P.2d 875 0947), the Utah Supreme Court declared that, "the father of 
a child has a legal duty to support his minor child, if he has the capacity 
to do so." 176 P.2d 875 at 876 (emphasis added). Among the other Utah 
decisions supporting the Hulse view are Rockwood v. Rockwood, 65 Utah 261, 
236 P.457 (1925); Cooke v. Cooke, 248 P.83 (Utah 1926); Anderson v. 
Anderson, 110 Utah 300, 172 P.2d 132 (1946); and Ottley v. Hill , 21 Utah 
2d 396, 446 P.2d 301 (1968). In each of these cases the Utah Supreme 
Court used slightly different wording, but conveyed the same principle, 
i.e., that liability for support exists only where the father has the 
ability to provide support. Thus in Rockwood, supra, the standard for 
determining liability to pay support was "if he [father] is able to do 
so," 236 P.457 at 460; in Cooke, supra, support liability would be 
imposed if providing support was "within his [father's] means," 248 P.83 
at 109; Ottley v. Hill, supra, would order the father to provide support 
"if he is able to do so," 446 P.2d 301 at 302. 
Anderson v. Anderson, supra, cited at pp.18-19 of Appellants' 
Brief, is instructive. In Anderson there was a variance between the 
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findings and decree with respect to alimony and support money in a 
divorce action. After clarifying this variance, the Utah Supreme Court 
held: 
. . . The criterion for determination of support 
money is the need of the persons supported and the 
defendant's [father's] ability to pay. 172 P.2d 
132 at 136. 
The courts of other jurisdictions have adopted this view. Thus, 
in Commonwealth v. Testa, 226 Pa.Super.585, 323 A.2d 199 ('97*0, a Penn-
sylvania Superior Court observed: 
. . . At the hearing ... there was no evidence 
regarding the husband's earning power. Nor was 
there evidence to show that the husband had any 
assets. For our court to sustain a support order, 
there must be sufficient evidence of the husband's 
ability to pay. The court below cannot base its 
decision on a conjectured ability to pay. 323 A.2d 
199 at 200-201. 
For another Pennsylvania case whose holding is in accord with Commonwealth 
v. Testa, supra, see Commonweal th v. Beckham, 186 Pa.Super.7*+, l*+0 A.2d 
kjl (1958). In Beckham, the court construed a statute similar to but 
with some distinctions from the UCLSA. The Beckham court held that the 
purpose of the Pennsylvania statute was: 
. . . to secure a reasonable allowance for the 
support of the wife, but only to the extent that 
it is consistent with the husband's property, 
income and earning capacity. ]k0 A.2d 271 at 472. 
The New York case of Rennselaer County Dept. of Social Serv. v. 
Cossart, 327 N.Y.S. 2d 117, 38 A.D.2d 635 (1971) is very much like the 
instant case. Appellant father had been directed by a New York Family 
Court to pay $75.00 per week as support for his wife and child, the right 
to proceed against the father having been assigned to the county department 
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of social services. The New York Appellate court stated: 
. . . The only basis for the award made is the 
unsworn statement made by attorneys for the Depart-
ment of Social Services in the course of colloquy 
between the court and counsel that respondent's 
[mother's] public assistance budget was $325.00 
per month ... it [the unsworn statement] is contrary 
to the wife's ... statement that she was receiving 
$56.00 per week, $26.00 from the Department of 
Social Services and $30.00 from appellant. Accord-
ingly* this proceeding must be remanded to the 
Rennselaer County Family Court with direction that 
a proper support proceeding be initiated and con-
ducted so as to resolve all the issue here in 
dispute. 327 N.Y.S. 2d 117 at 118. 
New York, it should be noted does not have the Uniform Civil Liability 
for Support Act. However, the court's reasoning in the Cossart case, 
supra, indicates that liability for support must be determined on a 
case-by-case basis, relative to the obligee's needs and the obligor's 
ability to provide support. 
California is one of four states to have enacted the UCLSA, 
Cal. Civil Code §§241 et seq. In Smi th v. Workmen's Compensation Appeals 
Board, 53 Cal. Rptr. 8l6 (Cal. App. 1966), the California Appellate Court 
was called upon to construe §3501 of the California Labor Code. Minor 
children in their father's custody sought recovery, under California's 
Workmen's Compensation Act, for their mother's death. The mother had been 
contributing to the children's support, even though no court had ordered 
her to do so. The California appellate court addressed itself to the 
question of who was supporting the children, at the time of the mother's 
death, within the meaning of §3501 of the California Labor Code? The 
Court held that there must be a presumption under §3501: 
which differentiates between the legal duty of the 
-£_ 
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parent to support the child and the current legal 
liability under that duty to support the child. 
Although the duty to support is constant, liability 
thereunder exists only when the obligee is in need 
of support and the obligor is able to support. j>3 
Cal. Rptr. 816 at 821-822. 
What emerges from the cases discussed thus far is that the;re 
is a difference between the unliquidated duty to support and a liquidated 
sum certain representing liability for support. This difference is 
attributable to the myriad possibilities involved in determining the 
relative standard of the obligee's needs and the obligor's ability to 
meet those needs. Respondents submit that the determination of support 
liability, how much and how it is determined, is sp]ely a matter of state 
law and, as will be seen in the next part of this Brief, that the Uniform 
Civil Liability for Support Act was enacted to facilitate application of 
the particular state's law of support liability, noc to establish ^ new 
standard which ignores the relative needs of obligees and ability of 
obligors to support those needs. 
POINT I I 
UNDER THE UNIFORM CIVIL LIABILITY FOR SUPPORT ACT, SUPPORT 
LIABILITY IS DETERMINED BY THE SUPPORT LAW OF EACH STATE, 
Appellants, in their Brief at p.7, state that a basic purpose 
of the Uniform Civil Liability for Support Act is the establishment of 
a statutory duty of support to be used in conjunction with the Uniform 
Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act (hereinafter URESA), which latter 
Act has been adopted by every state except Nevada. See §§77-6la-l et seq. 
U.C.A. 1953, as amended, for Utah's URESA. This statement that the two 
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Acts should be read in conjunction requires close scrutiny. 
In the Commissioners1 Prefatory Note to the UCLSA, Uniform 
Laws Annotated, Master Edition, Volume 9, the purpose of the UCLSA is 
set forth at p.1J3: 
The purpose of this act is to promote and facilitate 
the use of the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of 
Support Act ... Already the use of the Reciprocal 
Enforcement of Support Act to collect family support 
money across state lines has substantially lessened 
the burden on the public purse of supporting thousands 
of destitute families ... the Act [URESA] can operate 
most efficiently only when the duties of support are 
clearly and definitely stated in each state. 
The commissioners go on to observe that there has been confusion among* 
the states as to what constitutes the duty of support, some states not 
having a statutory duty, some with both common law and statutory duties, 
others having conflicting standards. To facilitate the use of URESA, 
the Uniform Civil Liability for Support Act was drafted for the purpose 
of creating a definite statutory duty to support in the drafting state. 
The Prefatory Note continues: 
The Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support 
Act provides in section 9 that "all duties of support 
are enforceable by action..." and in section 7 that 
"Duties of support applicable under this law (act) 
are those imposed or imposable under the laws of any 
state where the obligor was present during the period 
for which support is sought . . . 
Under these sections then the recovery by the 
destitute obligee is to be measured by the duty of 
support set out in the law of the state where the 
obiigor is present . . . 
There is nothing in the Commissioners' Prefatory Notes to either 
the UCLSA or the URESA concerning the obligor's 1iabi1ity for support, the 
Prefatory Notes to the two acts speak only to an obligor's duty to support. 
It is submitted that this omission of a commentary on support liability is 
-8-
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attributable to a very basic intention to not establish an arbitrary 
standard for determining support liability without regard to obligees' 
ability to provide, but rather to facilitate enforcement of the right 
to receive support once liability for support has been determined and 
fixed at a sum certain under the law of the particular state. The 
Uniform Civil Liability for Support Act sets out clearly what constitutes 
the duty to support; once this duty is established, liability thereunder 
should be determined at a hearing, using as guidelines the general 
criteria of §78-^+5-7 U.C.A. 
Legal commentator William Brockelbank agrees with the principle 
that support 1iabi1i ty depends on all the relative circumstances of the 
obligees and obligors, and that the purpose of UCLSA and URESA is to 
facilitate enforcement of liability, not to dictate an arbitrary standard 
for support liability determination. In his treatise Interstate Inforce-
ment of Family Support, 2nd Edition 1971, Mr. Brockelbank, in discussing 
the URESA, refutes two misconceptions, one that the URESA's purpose is to 
effect the greatest amount of support liability possible, the other that 
the standard of support liability should be uniform throughout the various 
states: 
Sometimes some of those who are most intimately 
involved with the enforcement of [URESA] reason that 
since [URESA] was meant to recover more and more relief 
money for more and more destitute families, the older 
text is to be preferred because it jj^ the most severe 
[emphasis original]. This becomes at times a sort of 
sadistic cry "let's soak the fleeing pappy." But this 
is an unworthy objective. No law should ever "soak" 
anybody. The purpose of law is to do even-handed justice. 
To take sides in favor of the plaintiff in any controversy 
is to throw justice to the winds. The amount of the 
judgment he [support obligor] has to pay must take into 
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account all the circumstances. One of these is the 
fact that, as of rights, he is now living in another 
state which may reguire less of him than the state 
he left, [Emphas is added]. Brockelbank, supra, 
chapter III, p.35. 
As mentioned above, it is urged that the Uniform Civil Liability 
for Support Act fixes the existence of a duty to support in the enacting 
state, but, that once this duty has been established, liability for 
support must be ascertained pursuant to the criteria of §78-45-7 U.C.A. 
Appellants contend, in their Brief at p.16, that §78-45-7 U.C.A. 
"apparently applies only to prospective support." Respondents submit 
that said section applies with egual force to both prospective and 
retrospective support liability. Clearly, liability for support, past 
or future, is a matter of individual state law, see Brockelbank, supra, 
p.9 of this Brief. Some states may allow a retrospective support order 
after a hearing to determine the amount due; others may bar recovery for 
any period during which the duty to support obtained but no hearing to 
fix support liability was held. Respondents believe that, under the law 
of Utah, there need not be a prior court order of support for a court to 
conduct a hearing to determine liability for support already provided. 
The duty to support exists in Utah independant of the UCLSA. Rees v. 
Archibald, 6 Utah 2d 264, 311 P.2d 788 (1957); §30-2-9 U.C.A. 1953, as 
amended. However, under the Utah Uniform Civil Liability for Support 
Act, support liability must be determined, whether for future or already 
furnished support, pursuant to the mandate of §78-45-7 U.C.A. To hold 
otherwisewould be to attach untoward significance to the UCLSA's one-
time use of the word "reimbursement" and to create a situation so illog-
ical that it could not have been the intention of the Utah Legislature 
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to do so, This position is addressed in the next Point of Respondents' 
Brief. 
POINT III 
THE UNIFORM CIVIL LIABILITY FOR SUPPORT ACT WAS ENACTED FOR 
THE PURPOSE OF OBTAINING SUPPORT FOR NEEDY OBLIGEES, NOT FOR PROVIDING 
THE STATE OF UTAH, ACTING AS A THIRD PARTY, WITH A RIGHT TO REIMBURSEMENT 
FOR NECESSARIES FURNISHED. 
A hypothetical example will help to illustrate Point III. 
Suppose that father is married to mother and that they have a minor child. 
After five years of wedded bliss, father and mother separate, with mother 
retaining custody of the child. Father remains within the state, but does 
not contribute any support to mother and child. Upon separation, mother 
immediately applies for and receives a grant under the ADC Program, 
receiving $200,00 per month from the state. After three years of the 
separation, mother, through the welfare department, brings an action for 
support under the UCLSA. Suppose furthermore that during the entire three 
year period before mother brought the UCLSA action, and for three yearsv 
after she brought it, the father's ability to contribute support to mother 
and child remains the same, and mother continues to receive an ADC grant 
in the amount of $200.00 per month. 
According to the arguments advanced in Appellants1 Brief, the 
welfare department is entitled to reimbursement of an amount equal to 
$200.00 per month for three years (the period during which existed no 
court order fixing support liability at a sum certain), but is entitled 
to only that amount ordered by the district court under §78-**5~7 U.C.A. 
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after the UCLSA hearing, even though the mother continues to receive the 
identical ADC grant. Appellants' interpretation is sound if during the 
entire period the father was possessed of sufficient ability to contribute 
$200.00 per month as support. But how can the district court which con-
ducts the UCLSA hearing know for a fact that the father had this ability 
to contribute support, unless competent evidence of that ability is 
presented to the court? Using Appellants1 interpretation of the UCLSA, 
for the period between separation and the UCLSA hearing, all the state 
need do is prove willful failure of the obligor to provide support, and 
reimbursement is measured by that amount which the state furnished. 
Appellants' argue that there need not be any determination under §78-45-7 
for retrospective support orders, yet contend at p.16 of their Brief, 
that the prospective support order entered against the father at the 
UCLSA hearing j[s governed by the standard of §78-45-7 U.C.A., which 
standard is: 
78-^5-7. Determination of amount of support.--When 
determining the amount due for support the court shall 
consider all relevant factors including but not limited 
to: 
(1) the standard of living and situation of 
the parties; 
(2) the relative wealth and income of the \ 
parties; 
(3) the ability of the obligor to earn, 
(4) the abi1ity of the obiigee to earn; 
(5) the need of the obligee; 
(6) the age of the parties; 
(7) the responsibility of the obligor for 
the support of others. 
One must condude from Appellants1 above-mentioned arguments 
that the UCLSA has two purposes: the first to provide a means, under 
§78-45-7 U.C.A., of obtaining prospective support orders against support 
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obligors; the second to provide the state with a method of obtaining 
reimbursement based not on §78-45-7 U.C.A., but on the amount of support 
furnished by the state. This position is not logically consistent. One 
reason for this inconsistency is that welfare grants are based upon 
criteria different from those set out in §78-45-7 U.C.A. See Plaintiff's 
Answers to Defendants1 Interrogatories, Answers 2(a), 2(b), contained jn 
the Record on Appeal in the instant case. These welfare grants do not 
consider the obligor-husband at all, and determination of the amount of 
the grant is made unilaterally, i.e., only the obligees' needs are 
considered. It may be that a court, under either the UCLSA or as an 
incident of a divorce proceeding, would order an obligor to pay an amount 
approximately equal to the ADC grant; but that would be a fortuitous 
occurrence, since the court would employ different criteria in determining 
support liability. Therefore, support liability, by which is meant liqui-
dation of the duty to support to an order against an obligor to pay a sum 
certain for support, is determined by criteria different than those used 
to determine the amount of. grants furnished to ADC recipients. This 
supports Respondents1 position that the measure of reimbursement is to 
be determined under §78-45~7 U.C.A. And a close look at §78-45-9 U.C.A, 
the meaning of which is at issue in this appeal, supports Respondents' 
position that the UCLSA deals only and exclusively with the question of 
support, not with reimbursement of a third party for necessaries furnished. 
The UCLSA defines "obligor", "obligee", and state as: 
78-45-2. Defini tions.—As used in this act: 
(1) "State" includes any state, territory or 
or possession of the United States, the District 
of Columbia and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. 
(2) "Obligor" means any person owing a duty of 
support. 
- n -
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(3) "Obi igee" means any person to whom a duty of 
support is owed. 
Enforcement of the duty of support is governed by: 
78-^5"9. Enforcement of right to support - Powers 
of the state department of public welfare. - The 
obligee may enforce his right of support against 
the obligor and the state department of public welfare 
may proceed on behalf of the obligee to enforce his 
right of support against the obligor. Whenever the 
state department of public welfare furnished support 
to an obligee, it has the same right as the obligee 
to whom the support was furnished, for the purpose of 
securing reimbursement and of obtaining continuing 
support. [Emphasis added] 
In §78-45-9, the word "support" is used five times; the word 
"reimbursement" is used once. Appellants, in their Brief at p.16, state 
that, "As to the former [reimbursement] the legislature must have assume^ 
the commonly accepted meaning of 'reimbursement' was so clear that there 
could be no dispute as to it." Respondents submit, it view of the 
absence of legislative history of the meaning of "reimbursement", as 
used in §78-45-9 U.C.A., and the obvious intention of the UCLSA to deal 
with support, that "reimbursement", as used in §78-45"9 U.C.A., means 
reimbursement of support, not reimbursement of necessaries furnished by1 
a third party, as will be seen below. 
Under §78-45-9 U.C.A., the state department of public welfare's 
rights are derivative, i.e., the agency may proceed "on behalf of the 
obligee" and has "the same right as the obligee to whom support was 
furnished, for the purpose of securing reimbursement and of obtaining 
continuing support." See Memorandum Decisions of Judge Gould, dated 
May 7, 1975; Summary Judgments dated May 21, 1975; Plaintiff's Answer 
to Request for Admission #3, all in the Record on Appeal of this case. 
-14-
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The State of Utah, therefore, in a proceeding under the UCLSA, has no 
rights greater than or other than those of the obligee to whom the State 
is subrogated. It is urged that these "rights of the obligee" are those 
concerning support only, and that the Utah law on obtaining support orders 
governs as to what amount, if any, to which the State is entitled. 
Respondents contend that the Utah law on determining the amount 
of support due from an obligor is governed by those criteria under which 
alimony and child support are decreed in actions for divorce and separate 
maintenance, §§30-3"1 et seq. U.C.A. 1953, as amended, and furthermore 
submit that these same criteria are embodied in §78-45-7 U.C.A. In 27 B, 
C.J.S., Divorce §319 (5) it is stated: 
The amount of the allowance for the support of the 
minor children of divorced parents is generally within 
the sound discretion of the court [Bu1ler v. Builen, 
71 Utah 63, 262 P.292 (1928); Tsoufakis v. Tsoufakis, 
14 Utah 2d 273, 382 P.2d 412 (1963); Bader v. Bader, 
18 Utah 2d 407, 424 P.2d 150 (1967)], and all the 
circumstances of the particular case should be con-
sidered in fixing it [McBroom v. McBroom, 14 Utah 2d 
393, 384 P.2d 961 (1963)]; but such discretion is 
limited to the conditions and financial ability existing 
at the time of the order. 
'
n a n
 Annotation, "Alimony-Retrospective Modification," 6 A.L.R. 
2d 1277, §25 st p.1331, it is stated: 
Where the court has granted a decree for alimony, 
separate maintenance, or support, it is generally held 
that the court does not have the power, or ought to 
refuse, to modify the decree by making an additional 
allowance for expenses incurred in the past. 
This A.L.R. position is supported by the Utah case of Openshaw v. 
Openshaw, 144 P.2d 528 (Utah 1943) in which a divorce decree had been 
entered previously and the recipient of the decree award sought to have 
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the decree modified. The Utah Supreme Court said: 
'
n
 Openshaw v. Openshaw, last cited, we held 
that the right of the trial court to modify an alimony 
or support money award does not extend to installments 
which have already accrued and which are past due, 
because the.right to collect such installments becomes 
vested upon their due date . . . ]kk P.2d 528 at p.530. 
Thus, in the normal course in Utah, child support and alimony 
or separate maintenance are determined in proceedings under §§30-3-1 
U.C.A., which embodies basically the same criteria as those set out in 
§78-45-7, U.C.A. Under these criteria, the ability of the obligor to 
actually provide support is always considered. Should the obligor be 
denied a chance to be heard as to his ability to provide support simply 
becase the obligee and the State elect to bring an action under the 
UCLSA and claim a right to reimbursement of an amount not previously 
decreed? To read §78-^5-9 U.C.A. as Appellants suggest it should be 
read is to bypass the long established criteria and procedures for 
determining support in favor of procedures not heretofore tested. 
Appellants in their Brief cite cases from other jurisdictions 
in which an order of reimbursement was entered based on the amount pro-1 
vided by the State and in which no prior order of support had been entered. 
The cases are Los Angeles County v. Frisbie, 19 Cal. 2d 63^, 122 P.2d 526 
(19^2), cited at p.8 of Appellants' Brief; and Langevin v. Hi 1Isborc ugh 
County, 320 A.2d 635 (N.H. 197*0. Respondents feel that these cases are 
d ist ingu ishable. 
'
n
 the Frisbie case, supra, the support statute in question 
was not the UCLSA, which California had not then enacted, but another 
statute which was quite different from the UCLSA. The California statute 
-16-
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to which Appellants refer was §2576 of the California Welfare and insti-
tutions Code, St. 1937. Unlike §78-45"9 U.C.A. , the California statute 
spec ifical1y stated: 
. . . Upon failure of such [responsible] kindred to 
support the indigent, the county may extend aid, and 
such kindred in the order above named and to the extent 
of thei r abi1i ty shall reimburse the county for the 
support of the indigent . . . 
The board of supervisors shall, in the case of 
aid granted by institutional care, fix a reasonable 
charge therefor, which shall be the measure of reim-
bursement to the county, and the existence of the order 
fixing the charge shall constitute prima facie evidence 
of its reasonableness. 
The Frisbie case, therefore, actually supports Respondents' position, 
since the statute involved took into account the obligors ability to 
pay. Furthermore, the statute clearly and unequivocally states that 
the obligor shall reimburse the county, a far cry from §78-45-9'$ con-
ferring of a right to seek reimbursement. 
Respondents will dispose of Appellants' citation to the 
Langevin case, supra, by mentioning the key distinction. Appellants' 
statement that the New Hampshire statute there in question was similar 
to the Utah UCLSA is somewhat misleading, since New Hampshire had, at 
the time the Langevin case was litigated, adopted the UCLSA. The 
Langevin case was, therefore, decided under a different statute, New 
Hampshire RSA 169:11 and 166:20, which statutes gave the town a specific 
right of action in its own right against the obligor, and not a subrogated 
right, as does §78-45-9 U.C.A. The Langevin case is, therefore, inapposite. 
Further credence is given to Respondents' position that the UCLSA, 
§78-^5-9 U.C.A. is not intended to give the State of Utah an independent 
right to reimbursement, by resort to the law of restitution. In the 
-17-
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Restatement of the Law Of Restitution - Quasi Contracts and Constructive 
Trusts, Chapter 5 - Benefits Voluntarily Conferred, §113, p.^+64 (American 
Law Institute 1937), it is stated: 
PERFORMANCE OF ANOTHERS NONCONTRACTUAL DUTY TO 
SUPPLY NECESSARIES TO A THIRD PERSON. 
A person who has performed the noncontractual 
duty of another by supplying a third person with 
necessaries which in violation of such duty the 
other had failed to supply, although acting without 
the other's knowledge or consent, is entitled to 
restitution therefor from the other if he acted 
unofficiously and with intent to charge therefor. 
This would appear to be the basis for Appellants' citation of Baggs v. 
Anderson, Utah , 538 P.2d 141 (197*0, at p.13 of their Brief. 
'
n
 Baggs v. Anderson, Justice Henriod, in his dissent, sounded 
a warning: 
that the hallmark of the main opinion considerably 
is based on the gratuity that if anybody, -just any-
body, -pays a decreed amount for X, beneficiary of a 
judgment, -has some kind of an immutable right to 
collect from the judgment debtor . . . 
Such a concept allows an interloper, not par-
ticeps to a debts, and not a litigant ... to muscle 
in on a contract or debt or judgment and collect on 
a voluntary payment of someone else's obligation, -
when the latter may be subject to a legal defense ... 
528 P.2d 141 at 145. 
Justice Henriod apparently was concerned that the doctrine of reimbursing 
third parties, as set out in the Restatement of Restitution, supra, was 
being stretched to cover situations for which its use was never intended. 
Justice Henriod's warning has applicability to the instant 
case. The Utah State Department of Social Services was already under 
its own duty to provide support for the named female plaintiffs before 
the instant proceedings were brought. §§55-15a-1 et seq. U.C.A. 1953, 
as amended, are the Public Assistance Act of Utah, one portion of which 
- i f t _ 
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is the ADC Program. The relevant sections of said Act are: 
55-15a-1. Purpose of act. -"Person in need" defined, 
-It is the purpose of this act to provide assistance 
to any person in Utah in need. A person is in need 
and entitled to assistance if sufficient resources are 
not available for his use within the limitations set 
forth herein and who otherwise qualifies. 
55-15a~17. . . . 
Assistance shall be be provided under this act 
for individuals who qualify as follows: 
• • • 
(3) Persons in need, that 
. . . 
(a) are children under the age of 21 . . . and 
who have been deprived of natural or step-parent 
support or care, and 
(b) are natural or step-parents or relatives 
who have the custody and control of such needy children. 
[By 1975 amendment, this section is now §55-15a-17 
(3) (a), (b)] 
55-15a-24. ... Assignment of alimony or support pay-
ments ... 
. . . 
The office [of Assistance Payments] is authorized 
to accept an assignment of court ordered alimony or 
child support from any recipient of assistance. An 
assignment of alimony or support shall include payments 
ordered, decreed, or adjudged by an court within the 
State of Utah or any other state or territory of the 
United States and is not in lieu of or to supersede 
or alter any other court order, decree or judgment. 
No assignment may be used as a requirement to establish 
eligibility for assistance ... 
The State of Utah, being already under an affirmative duty to provide 
assistance to "persons in need", cannot be deemed to be acting "unof-
ficiously and with intent to charge therefor" within the meaning of 
the Restatement of Restitution, supra. Moreover, the right to reim-
bursement conferred by §78-*+5-9 U.C.A. on the State is the right the 
obligee has, not the right of a third party. The obligees in the 
instant case did not furnish the support; therefore the State has no 
independent third party right to reimbursement. 
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CONCLUSION 
Respondents feel that adoption of the views they express herein 
will not harm the citizenry of Utah. Respondents do not contend that 
because there was no prior order of support, that they have been relieved 
of either their duty to provide it or their potential liability. Rather, 
they ask only that the Supreme Court of Utah declare that in proceedings 
under the UCLSA, §78-45-9 U.C.A., for both prospective and retrospective 
support orders, a hearing must first be had under §78-45-7 U.C.A. so 
that the proper amount of liability can be fixed. 
It is clear that the trial court was correct in ordering 
summary judgment. Appellants have, in their Brief, misconstrued Judge 
Gould's decision to the extent that they interpret his holding that "the 
[welfare] agency cannot obtain a judgment for a sum certain without first 
obtaining an order for monthly support" to mean that because they had 
not obtained such a prior order, they are forever barred from obtaining 
reimbursement. Judge Gould's decisions can and should be read to mean 
that the State can seek reimbursement; but that in order to obtain 
judgment for a sum certain as reimbursement, the State must first 
establish the amount to which it is entitled at a hearing pursuant to 
the Uniform Civil Liability for Support Act, §78-45-7 U.C.A. 1953, as 
amended. Affirmance of the lower court will relieve the taxpayers of a 
burden; it will not impose a greater one. 
Respectfully submitted, 
MARTIN W. CUSTEN 
Attorney for Respondents 
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